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T
O ESTABLISH TERRITORIAL PLACE is a
small-scale act. But it is achieved in 
encounters with processes of territoria-
lisation and reterritorialisation on a larger scale.
I want to connect what I have to say on the small
scale to a theoretical source on the large scale, to
which very many others have already referred.
The writings of Deleuze and Guattari (particu-
larly 1992) have charged territoriality, territori-
alisation and deterritorialisation with a potent
load. Territoriality was already, of course, a prin-
ciple of animal and bird life. But in their work it
goes even further and becomes what I would call
an arche-metaphor. This both informs and de-
flects their attention to and from specifically
human and historical actions that make territory.
So I will start by attaching a transformer to the
power supply of Deleuze and Guattari. 
Territorialisation: Deleuze and Guattari
Let me be clear that in this article small-scale
territorialisation is the marking and therefore
the making of a territorial place. A territory is a
special kind of place of social interaction. It is
special by its openness, in comparison to more
enclosed and confined places such as rooms or
halls. By territorial openness I mean the quality
of being without walls but not without interior-
ity. A marked territory has a focal point that
might well be a building and its interiors. It is
usually bounded, clearly or notionally, and is
identified by a focal point and often by a name.
Furthermore the place may contain smaller-
scale places or differently defined places of the
same name according to different mental and
symbolic maps.1 But so long as it is marked
and centred as opposed to having mere territo-
rial extension, the open ground – the market
place, the street, the square, part of a park, the
neighbourhood, a territorial cult, the streets of a
carnival, or a village – is also an opening to 
a greater variety of interactions than are more
enclosed spaces. And compared with more
mental, conceptual and media spaces, the
physicality of the social interactions, their bod-
ily and emotional force, in short the multi-
sensoriality of interaction is a special quality of
territorial places. Lastly, what makes territorial
place special is its opening to what are other-
wise different specialisations in the division of
labour, distinction of life-styles, and exploi-
tation of classes. Deleuze and Guattari (1992:
321) make this point on a far grander scale:
territorialisation “groups all the forces of the
different milieus [of species] together.”
Deleuze and Guattari have produced a fun-
damental way of thinking about territorialisa-
tion, but I am interested in it at the point where
their arche-metaphorical treatment becomes
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most political. In the book, A Thousand Plaeaus,
territorialisation is to be understood as a process
of bringing different codes into each other’s
purview such that they decode each other or sim-
ply refer to each other – for instance creating a
relation of mimicry (op. cit.: 10). Territoriali-
sation is thus the adding of dimensions and hier-
archy. In my more restricted sense it is the
bringing of hierarchically and laterally separated
elements together so that they become visible to
each other in the most inclusive and substantial
way, which is by territorial sharing of place. The
counter-process, deterritorialisation, is either
negatively ‘diagrammatic’ or creatively ‘axio-
matic.’ (Ibid.: 143) In other words, deterritoria-
lisation turns into one code-substance or into
indeterminacy what was more than one code.
Negative deterritorialisation is abstraction, in
which a single plane, which is a diagram, dis-
poses simply as function and matter whatever
constitutes that dimension-diagram. It is an as-
pect of substance, form, expression and content,
but it is the aspect that pilots them all. So, for in-
stance, ‘pretensions to a general semiology’
(ibid.: 143) at the time Deleuze and Guattari
were writing abstracts everything into something
like a language. It is a process that turns a rela-
tion between codes and substances into an order
of relations on one plane. The converse move of
bringing the plane into a relation of, for instance,
conjunction is reterritorialisation. 
Positive deterritorialisation and reterrito-
rialisation are transformative clashes, a spilling
over, a flight, or a merging. They recode and
decode distinctions and separations, reducing
and then creating new assemblages and their
strata. Capitalism is at once creative and nega-
tive, diagrammatic and axiomatic.
Deleuze and Guattari do not confine deterri-
torialisation and reterritorialisation to any his-
tory. They write at a level of generality that
includes natural history, thought, and desire in
a mood that might once have been religious but
in their case is an anarchic materialism. Expo-
sition, at least mine, is extraction rather than
comprehension. But it can truthfully be said
that what they write does have a definite direc-
tion. It is to be used in a current situation, in
which capitalism is the ultimate abstraction.
‘Capitalism,’ as they conceive it after Marx,
“forms when the flow of unqualified wealth en-
counters the flow of unqualified labour and
conjugates with it… This amounts to saying
that capitalism forms with a general axiomatic
of decoded flows.” On the same page they com-
ment, again in italics, that this amounts to a
‘new threshold of deterritorialisation.’ (Ibid.:
453, their emphasis) Capitalism, they claim, is
the axiom of the commodity. It has and needs
no territory, but on the contrary is realised in
everything else as a function that converts
everything into abstract values and the abstract
right of private property. This is ever more so in
the third age of capitalism, that of Information
Technology. But I would add the obvious rider
that realisation includes certain territorial forms,
such as corporate headquarters, shopping malls,
golf courses, rows of workers’ barracks, the
shanties of informal economies, plus the ruined
wastes of dislocation and the extraction of raw
materials. 
For Deleuze and Guattari, states under cap-
italism are realisations of its abstraction, but
they are multiform, different models of capital-
ism’s axiom. I shall be considering later and
more concretely how state territorialisation
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combines with capitalist territorialisation. At
this point I want only to affirm that different
states do make a difference, and that capitalist
territorialisation has a definite content. 
Postmodernity and Modernity: The Colonial
Combination
Before coming back to that assertion, I want
first to deal with a mode of theorising that also
tends to the very general: the extensive theori-
sation of the postmodern condition. 
Post-modern presumes, exceeds but does
not surpass ‘modern,’ so let us understand with
Deleuze, Guattari and many others that ‘mod-
ernisation’ is the commoditisation of all pro-
duction and exchange, in other words, the
emergence and self-transformation of a capital-
ist economy. For the developing world, includ-
ing China, there has been no rejection of the
project of modernisation. At the same time
there is the common sense, governmental rhet-
oric and economic policies for dealing with and
taking advantage of ‘globalisation.’
At the level of politics modernisation is the
formation of a state and a bureaucratic admin-
istration that can manage and regulate such an
economy and have the powers of territorial sov-
ereignty to protect a local instance of it. At the
level of ideology, modernisation is a state pro-
ject and the idea of private property. In social
science and historiography modernisation is
teleology – a process in a definite direction that
is both law-like and politically driven. 
Postmodernism, then, as a kind of knowl-
edge is a critique and a rejection. As critique it
is the exposure of modernisation as ideology
and teleology. With the critique comes the
rejection of a pair of assumptions. One is the
assumption of progress or development. The
idea that economic development is necessarily
good is rejected with the knowledge that it is
also a massive dislocation and incapacitation
of human populations and that it can become –
on a global scale – self-defeating by destroying
the resources on which growth depends. The
other rejected assumption is that of structural
and functional determination. But a close sub-
stitute for it is ‘globalisation.’ Replacing the
grand narrative of modernity, globalisation
stands as an equally grand spatial determinant
in various formulations of a new era, in which
the whole globe is affected by transnational
corporations, massive dislocation, accelerated
and increased migration, and the capitalism of
electronic data storage and transmission. 
In sum, there has been no liberation from
economic constraints; it is just that they have to
be specified. They are not assumed to be a deter-
miner in the last instance of everything else 
social and cultural. But capitalism is known and
understood to be a process that makes anything
else into a commodity. I will suggest that this
process in its territorialising aspect is effective in
an interesting way that is misapprehended as
‘hybridity,’ and that it is not all-conquering.
In built environments, modernism, as op-
posed to modernity, is a movement in architec-
ture, town planning, and design (as well as
other arts). It has been a break with all conven-
tions, an iconoclasm, to rethink old forms and
create new structures that use the latest devel-
opments of materials and technologies, no
longer disguised either as forms or as materials.
As against modernism, postmodernism is
eclectic and a play of surfaces, whatever their
structures.
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As for eclecticism and globalisation, it must
be noted that the colonial condition was post-
modern. Colonial subjects experienced disloca-
tion and the acute ambivalence of desire for and
deep resentment of the (dominating) other. The
dominating other was global: the system of im-
perialist nation states. Imperialist agents too ex-
perienced an acute ambivalence of desire as they
projected ‘culture’ and ‘civilisation’ upon the
people and landscape of the colonised and what
they projected came back with results that were
disturbingly different.2 In other words, the inde-
terminacy of form, discourse and population,
which usually comes under the label ‘hybridity,’
including eclectic agglomerations of architec-
tural styles and syncretic mixes of religions and
cults, is both colonial and postcolonial, modern
and postmodern. This and an almost complete
absence of modernism3 were true of China, even
though China was not fully colonised. 
As in the colonised continents, modernity in
China was confined to enclaves of capital ac-
cumulation, capitalist industrialisation, and
cities with finance at their centre and urban
workers in their sprawling peripheries. What
has characterised the last fifty years in China
has been a spread of modernity but not of mod-
ernism from a few to a great many cities and
large towns. In cultural terms, the particularly
fast spread of the past twenty years has brought
about a mixing of styles of food, clothing, and
architecture in all but the most remote zones.
More generally it has been a turning of what
was taken as normal and done as habit into
something done with an element of choice, in-
cluding rituals and festivals of territorial cults.
It will be necessary to specify the extent of
such penetration and self-consciousness.
Modernisation in China
In fact there have been three modernisations in
China.4 The first was a combination of impe-
rialist and republican modernisation, which
lasted for about a century from 1850. The sec-
ond lasted twenty-five years from 1953 to 1978.
It was a planned and collectivist modernisation,
an anti-capitalist modernisation defined against
private property and imperialist domination, that
included much large and heavy industry and
some rural as well as urban small and light in-
dustry. Since then there has been the fastest
modernisation of the three, with private and
transnational corporations supplementing state-
backed corporations. It has been a revision of the
second, a project of the state with many admin-
istrative powers but no longer directed through a
strictly limited number of state and collective
forms of organisation. Colonial hybridity has
been replaced by consumerist hybridity – by the
unleashing of barely regulated market forces and
a bewildering plethora of inducements to con-
sume, increasing every year with very fast eco-
nomic growth and the opening of borders. 
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2. This point was made with his habitual attention to the
middle ground of uncertainty, or indeterminacy between
the coupling implied by ‘hybridity,’ by Bhabha (1994).
3. The original plan of the city of Chandhigar in India (by
Le Corbusier), and a number of buildings in Hong Kong,
including those of the Bank of China and the Hong Kong
and Shanghai Bank, are some of the exceptional few. 
4. This is to discount the very much longer and slower (a
thousand years long) process of commoditisation of
China’s economy, including its commercialisation and
the spreading of contracts, paper money and banking, that
preceded fully-fledged industrial and finance capitalism
in China. 
I shall be concerned with the last two mod-
ernisations. I stress, along with Dirlik and
Zhang that both have been state projects.
“While Chinese leaders like to speak of ‘using
capitalism to develop socialism’, the current 
reality may well be the reverse: the use of 
‘socialism’ to achieve capitalist development.”
(2000: 5) The first thing Dirlik and Zhang cite
under the current ‘socialism’ of the Chinese
state is its partial control and release of enor-
mous amounts of cheap labour. This has been
the greatest single factor behind the extraor-
dinary growth of the Chinese economy, its suc-
cessful attraction of foreign investment and 
its ability to under-price the products of other
economies in foreign markets.
The main characteristic of the most recent
modernisation is the speed and penetration 
of commodification, which had been severely
reduced and held in check for twenty-five
years. This includes land and real estate, even
while the state retains an element of control
through the legal qualification of ultimate own-
ership by the people or the state. Decollecti-
visation of labour organisation, the sale of
labour-power, the loosening of controls over
the sale of the use of land, and lax (or ineffec-
tive) regulation of its exploitation, have inti-
mately affected villages as populations and as
territory. Released from restraints, commodi-
fication has indeed affected all aspects of social
life, including what can be understood in the
broadest sense as ‘culture.’
The result is that within a single geography
a state project, transnational capitalism, and
other senses of being in the world and ways of
producing a livelihood co-exist. Within the
same borders, within the same person, there are
different modes of being, different senses of
time, different narrations of their own and col-
lective stories. In the words of Dirlik and
Zhang, ‘spatial fracturing and temporal disso-
nance’ may be the ‘ultimate justification for the
use of the term’ postmodernity (op. cit.: 4). 
It is possible that these different senses of
being in the world are sealed off from each
other, but reference to the sharing of a civiliza-
tional and a political centre called ‘China’ bring
them together. What might otherwise have been
sealed off is thus reflected in and by other
modes and times, each becomes self-conscious,
reflected in the other codifications, or in what
Foucault named ‘heterotopias.’ (1986) In the
process of juxtaposition what was a heterotopia
can be deterritorialised into a commodity. For
instance, marketing the remote as a commodity
for tourism makes self-consciousness into a 
resource for an industry. Or take another in-
stance, the state project of creating heritage
symbols for ethnic or civic pride is at the same
time a corporate identity to attract investment
and trade and an opportunity for the recon-
struction of local temples. These are examples
of twin processes of deterritorialisation. In one
it is decentralised in that it is purely for mar-
keting. In the other it is state centralised. Both
at the same time reflect and disrupt other mark-
ings of territorial space. But instead of ‘deterri-
torialisation’ I will argue that the processes of
commodification and state abstraction are terri-
torialisations on a larger scale.
State Territorialisation and Compromise
State projects and commodification are abstrac-
tions of territory that can annihilate territorial
places. James Scott’s book, Seeing Like a State
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(1998), describes state territorialisation as the
creation of legibility and simplification. It is the
turning of multiplicity and interwoven senses
of being into the maps, censuses, and infra-
structures of a regulated and husbanded capital-
ist economy and its administration. It is the
turning of territorial places into extensions of
the more abstract territory of a sovereign, capi-
talist state. It serves the territorialisation of cap-
italist instrumentality, including the sites for
outlets, housing, storage, plants, and means of
transport and communication for the production
and marketing of commodities. Each market
will have its own codes and needs, not just
tourism of course, but markets of finance, of
food and apparel, of hardware, of raw materials
and of capital goods, each specifying their own
uses of space and construction. So we have two
simplifications of territory, that of the state ad-
ministration and that of capitalist instrumental-
ity. Of course, they are always combined but it
is possible to concentrate on one or the other.
Scott sees state territorialisation through the
prism of utopian projects, such as the landscape
of Soviet collectivisation and the city of High
Modernisation exemplified by Brasilia and
Chandighar. These utopian projects are state
territorialisation at its most simplistic: the nar-
rowing of complexity into facts relevant for
centralised administration on the one hand and
for a purified aesthetic on the other. Against
such extremes he contrasts the grass-roots prac-
tical knowledge that cannot be written into a
programme, drawn into a design or used as a
universal recipe. This knowledge has great
local precision and is at once conservative and
adaptive, accumulating and discarding ele-
ments over time and with practice. He uses the
Greek word metis to describe this practical,
agglomerative knowledge. 
Abstraction versus metis is a clear and intri-
guing contrast. But its attractive clarity misses
the compromises with the particular and the
local that is much more characteristic of modern
states. Modern states leave room for the particu-
lar in processes such as that of statistical survey
or the surveillance that Foucault described as
normalisation. Normalisation is neither rational-
isation nor measure but governed by the notion
of probability and the techniques of epidemio-
logy, which are by nature about co-variation.
“Statistics of populations and of deviancy form
an integral part of the industrial state.” (Hacking
1991: 183) Similarly the Rule of Law, based on
a universalising drive from a sovereign centre,
nonetheless includes devices for practical varia-
tion in the use and creation of precedent and the
notion of the ‘reasonable person’ which changes
with changes in conventional mores. A third and
last point to add to this list is that state projects
include policies to cultivate a sense of the local
that is not subversive but is a point of negotiation
and manoeuvre for other senses and stories of
place than those of the state and its locations.
In all of these cases the state project destroys but
at the same time recreates a mix that it makes
legible to itself but does not fully incorporate.
Two Cosmologies of State Abstraction:
North America and China
Another, possibly more serious qualification
must be made to Scott’s account of state ab-
straction. He writes as if it were anonymous,
without a specifiable character. But every state
acts within a tradition of abstraction that is or
was a cosmology, a mapping of the world. So,
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for instance, Richard Sennett (1990: 46-68) can
trace a cosmology and its transformations from
the grid of Roman camps with enclosed central
squares (for gatherings and for the reading 
of omens) to New York. The Roman square be-
came the grid with neutral squares (sparse gath-
erings and no omens) of the Puritan settlers in
North America. This in turn became the blocks
of strip development without any bounds.
‘Modern’ abstraction is, in short, traceable to a
European anonymity required by Puritan self-
searching, which turns into the anonymity 
of individual self-seeking, the shopping plaza,
and ribbon development: a particularly North
American combination of state and capitalist
territorialisation. It has been imported into all
countries including China, along with three
architectural types: the skyscraper, the apart-
ment block and the villa, as symbols of moder-
nity (King and Kusno 2000). 
Another tracing is possible in China. It could
start with a grid that in form is exactly the same
as the Roman, but whose axial north-south ori-
entation is based on a completely different cos-
mology, a different conception of the relation
between heaven and earth mediated by human-
ity. The chief mediator was the emperor and his
dynasty, whose processions through the grid,
and whose territorial space toward the north
were not to be seen by any but selected officials,
whereas the majesty and triumphs of a Roman
emperor were to be seen by all citizens as a pag-
eant. The later high central places of Augustinian
and other Christian cities were also to be seen –
like skyscrapers. A Chinese city by contrast was
an extension of the domestic courtyard space
and its rooms or, in grander houses, halls. The
authority of an imperial city or of a great temple
within a walled city and its alleys was to be
sensed and inferred from the scale of its walls
and the sight of the great pitch and elaborated
ridges of the roofs of the halls within. The con-
trast of this architecture and plan with high-rise
blocks of apartments and corporate skyscrapers
can be seen in every large Chinese city. 
To this contrast a further contrasting archi-
tecture of grids and enclosed spaces must be
added. The remaining walls of most inner cities
had been demolished and turned into boule-
vards during the 1953-1978 period of modern-
isation, when another architectural grid became
the rule. Between boulevards were the enclosed
and large expanses of work units, factory build-
ings with their chimneys or low-rise corridor
offices behind grand gated entrances and,
within the same enclosure, the large low-rise
blocks of dormitories and small apartments for
staff and workers. In brief, four kinds of plan
co-exist in Chinese cities: the traditional court-
yard, the work-unit, the strip, and the broad,
tree-lined boulevard that is another, this time
European, import from the colonial era.
We can contrast two subjects induced by
them. The self-regulating individual of 
Foucault’s biopolitics and Sennett’s self-seeker
in the age of consumption were introduced into
China along with philosophical and market
liberalism and the architecture of privacy and
the commodity.5 They are to be contrasted with
the imperial, patriarchal and peer-regulated in-
dividual, and the extension of peer regulation
through the gaze of the Party by its system of
files kept on every citizen and through the
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5. These are explored in a rural context by Yan Yunxiang
(forthcoming). 
work-unit.6 It is a contrast and a co-existence,
perhaps also a particular contextual blending
of two kinds of conscience or superego: the 
internalisation of original guilt in the auto-
nomous individual of liberalism versus the 
internalisation of potential shame and embar-
rassment in the socially conscious individual
of a modified collectivism. 
Urban spread in China is like North Ameri-
can strip or ribbon development, sometimes
with eclectically added Chinese features, such
as the flying eave and the curved roof. But
where it meets the architecture of villages and
their fields, it meets another version of Chinese
cosmology. This is the art called fengshui. It is
the art of siting dwellings not according to the
authority and privilege of a sovereign, but from
the perspective of any central placing. Feng-
shui as we now know it began in the Song 
dynasty (11th-12th centuries), and sprang from
a social revolution and a radical reform of state
ideology: a breaking down of the privileges of
noble families. Commoners too could have
grave-worship, ancestral halls, genealogies 
and temples, and the sites of their graves could
be as auspicious as any other, even the em-
peror’s (Feuchtwang 2002: chapter 2). Gods in
their temple palaces were imagined to be as
powerful as emperors. The siting of a local
temple could enhance the well-being of those
who lived in the territory that it and its festivals
defined, just as the siting of an imperial city
and imperial tombs could enhance the well-
being of a reign and its dynasty. The impor-
tance of graves and the territorial fengshui of
local temples in cities, towns, and villages re-
mains in much though not all of continental
China, long after the end of imperial dynasties
(in 1911) and despite their suppression during
the periods of republican and communist 
modernisation. 
Armed with these re-conceptions of the
great processes of state and capitalist territori-
alisation and reterritorialisation, let us now see
how they work at the level of the local state in
China and let us then see what we can learn
about these great processes from this level.
Meifa: Encounters with Reterritorialisation
In an inland part of Fujian province, the county
capital of Anxi has been spreading schools,
apartment blocks, factories and new streets into
neighbouring villages. My colleague Wang
Mingming has been studying one of those vil-
lages, Meifa, since 1992, and we visited it 
together in 1992, 1995 and 2002. In those ten
years, we have seen the results of the county
purchasing ‘people’s’ collective, village land
and leasing it to various enterprises as well as
constructing new roads through parts of the vil-
lage. In short, we have witnessed the partial 
absorption of a village into a city, something
happening all over China. Of course, this had
been happening for hundreds of years with the
increasing number and sizes of towns and
cities: as China’s economy commercialised
from the Song dynasty onwards.7 But the speed
and extent of physical change in territory, land-
scape and architecture have been dramatic in
the past fifty years. 
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6. For an extended exposition of this kind of regulation
see Dutton (1992).
7. As Skinner (1964) made elegantly clear. See also Gates
(1997).
In 1992, I walked along narrow dikes be-
tween paddy plots that would not have existed
fifteen years before, when the village was a
brigade within a commune and when land was
consolidated. In those fifteen years the second
of two decollectivisations had taken place. The
first was the land reform of 1950-1952. It was
a decollectivisation of communal land, which
is to say the fields belonging to the local line-
age and the fields belonging to the local territo-
rial cult. Revenue from the farming of those
fields had sustained the festivals and the build-
ing of the lineage hall and the local temple.
Each institution defined and now once again
defines Meifa as a territorial place in different
ways. The lineage hall defines it as the centre
of co-residence of those related in descent from
four brothers, and as a hall where the elders of
the lineage can gather, be respected and feasted
at lineage ceremonies. The ancestral land was
in five parts, two belonging to the hall and the
rest in three trusts attached to the tombs of
three brothers, founding ancestors of three of
the four branches of the lineage. In other
words, this focus makes Meifa a nested hierar-
chy of territorial places that are the segments of
a local lineage. The temple defines Meifa more
inclusively as a territorial place, without refer-
ence to line of descent, and in relation to
greater regional centres of pilgrimage proces-
sion, which depart from Meifa to one or an-
other of these centres at the beginning of the
lunar year. The temple and the space in front of
it, thronged with villagers and festival guests
watching the theatre on the external stage, are
also important as a centre of the village at ordi-
nary times. It is where women as well as men
come to bring offerings and chat, whereas the
ancestral hall is a male affair. The temple is also
where children from different parts of the vil-
lage come and play together. 
After the lands of hall and temple were con-
fiscated and redistributed to poor peasants in
the early 1950s, the financing of the two insti-
tutions came solely from subscriptions and do-
nations of villagers. That is how it remains after
the second decollectivisation of land, distrib-
uted to households in 1980-1982. Even so, the
green paddy fields in front of the temple that
were its communal land have a special signifi-
cance. And so do the space and a very impor-
tant tree in front of the ancestral hall. All of
them are sites of encounter with state and capi-
talist territorialisation.
The Ancestral Hall and a Fengshui Tree
When I first visited Meifa in 1992, it was at the
time of the seventh lunar month festival in
which both named ancestors are honoured and
the ghosts of forgotten and neglected ancestors
are succoured with offerings of food, paper
spirit clothing and paper spirit money.8 I was
taken to a place where many villagers had
placed their ghost offerings in the open. It was a
‘corner’ of the village (as neighbourhoods are
called in this part of China) near the bank of the
broad river that flows through Anxi and just be-
yond this point bends to pass the county seat
and go on to the regional city of Quanzhou.
There was a broad path along the bank, lined by
bamboo groves. The offerings were arranged
slightly inland from this path, on a rise that was
The Urbanisation of Meifa Village
. . . .
257
8. The long history of this festival can be read in Teiser
(1988); for an account of how it is performed in Taiwan,
within the same religious culture as that of Anxi in 
Fujian, see Weller (1987).
a clear space between the village houses of that
neighbourhood and the bamboo groves. I was
told that this was the place where there had been
an ancestral hall. Later Wang Mingming learned
that in fact the hall had been rebuilt by the vil-
lagers in 1962 but destroyed during the Cultural
Revolution only five years later in 1967. 
Among the trees that lined the riverbank
was one particularly large and gnarled tree.
Further along the bank below it, near the sur-
face of the water, was a small shrine to the
Earth God of that part of the riverbank. This
part of the river and the neighbourhood beyond
it are called Cui-a-be. Cui-a-be mean ‘water’s
tail.’ When we were told of this name it was al-
ways associated with water control. We were
told that the tree had been planted several hun-
dred years previously to prevent the river flood-
ing the village. The way in which I had seen the
riverbank and the offerings in the open was a
reversion to a time several hundred years ear-
lier when the tree existed but no hall had yet
been built. The tree’s roots, and those of the
neighbouring trees, probably did hold the bank
together and thus act as a preventor of floods.
But the tree was also described as a fengshui
tree, planted to enhance the gathering of qi,
flows of material energy, in a perceivable site
that encompassed the neighbourhood. In short,
it constituted the focal point that marked a ter-
ritorial place whose borders were notional but
perceivable and which included the houses of a
definite neighbourhood. But the reversion to
that time in 1992 was filled with the memories
and the effects of the most thorough state pro-
ject in Chinese history.
The destruction of the ancestral hall in the
Cultural Revolution left the tree intact. It also
left intact vivid memories of the hall. They 
remained in conjunction with the culmination
of collectivisation. Collectivisation of land and
labour organisation in 1956, interrupted by the
great starvation and the partial decollectivi-
sation of 1961-1963 that engineered a recovery
of agricultural production, continued from
1963 to 1978. Through the hierarchy of Party
branches down to the level of the production
brigade (a large village or collection of smaller
villages) it was a state project which consoli-
dated land and replaced all other centres of ter-
ritorial place with brigade halls and offices. It
was also the mobilisation of labour for the
building of roads and village streets, and for the
digging of irrigation channels and the building
of flood controls. And finally it introduced, in
Meifa as elsewhere, small-scale rural industrial
plants closely related to agricultural crops and
local construction – rice mills, brick kilns, fer-
tiliser and cement plants, and timber yards.
Long before, it had abolished the cash earning
activities of the earlier republican period,
which in Meifa had included working as river
boatmen. 
In short, collectivisation territorialised the
whole of China and its landscape in a remark-
ably monolithic image that was legible to a
centre and through which the production and
distribution of nearly every rural good and
service was organised. But as so many studies
of villages in China starting with Chen Village
(Chan, Madsen and Unger 1984) have shown,
local leaders nevertheless had the capacity and
room to manoeuvre in their interpretations of
central policy directives. They manoeuvred to
protect and serve their fellow villagers in ways
that varied even within a single village. Local
Stephan Feuchtwang
. . . .
258
loyalty remained a primary criterion of respect
for local leaders. In Meifa this included admi-
ration for the senior cadre who had unofficially
aided the reconstruction of the ancestral hall in
1962. He had eventually been removed from
his post and the Party for subsequent acts of
loyalty to his fellow villagers, when his county-
level protectors’ powers declined in factional
strife. Even so, even in his disgrace, his friend
the brigade Party Secretary put him in charge of
local small-scale industrial projects.9 You could
say that he and the many others in his position
throughout China were using a kind of political
metis, using Scott’s term, but this did not just
mean local practical knowledge. It is political
nous without which, together with unofficial
entrepreneurial ‘fixing’ between units of pro-
duction, the objectives of central plans could
not have been met in China or any of the Soviet
bloc countries. It is a nous that creates compro-
mises within state projects.
Flood control included reinforcing the river-
bank. But, as I say, the tree remained, and so
did the memory of the ancestral hall and of this
cadre’s loyalty to his fellow villagers. By the
time I returned to Meifa in 1995 the same ex-
cadre had managed a reconstruction of the an-
cestral hall for a second time in his life, on its
old site. At the same time he had continued to
be an industrial manager, but now working for
a Hong Kong Chinese investor, not the village
collective. He had managed the building of a
factory for this investor on a piece of village
land where the collective brick kiln had been.
In this he had again demonstrated his loyalty to
fellow villagers by successfully insisting that
the factory employ at least 100 Meifa residents,
whereas the investor wanted to employ only
people from his ancestral home village, further
away. Like others from more remote areas of
the same province working in shops and facto-
ries on the spreading industrial estates of Anxi
county city, they were housed on a new street
built by the county on land bought from Meifa.
So this ex-cadre manager was an agent for both
the new, post-Mao, capitalist and state territori-
alisation and also a leader of the re-assertion of
patriarchal territorial place. But there was a
clash between the two.
The newly rebuilt ancestral hall now had a
clear view onto the river. This might have been
welcome, but the reason why the view was clear
was a very destructive county project. The bam-
boo and all the other trees along the river had
been cleared, and the no-longer wooded path
had been broadened and raised as the founda-
tions for an all-weather surfaced road were laid
down. The fengshui tree was left standing, but
only because it had been saved by a large-scale
protest from Meifa villagers. They mobilised all
the connections they could muster through resi-
dents holding government posts, such as the
man who had been Party Secretary of Meifa and
had employed the manager of the ancestral hall
to manage industries in Meifa. From village
Party Secretary he had risen to become chair-
man of the assembly of a neighbouring town-
ship. He and others succeeded in preventing the
county road crew from destroying the ancient
tree. To seal their identification with Meifa they
were given prominent roles in the ceremonies
for the opening of the new ancestral hall. On the
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9. For the full story and for many more details of the his-
tory of Meifa, read Feuchtwang and Wang (2001: chapters
3-5). 
instructions of the geomancer, who had also ori-
ented the whole building at an angle to the river-
bank, the hall had been built on a higher
platform than its predecessor in order that the
height of the new road would not block its view
onto the broad expanse of river water gathering
in front of it. But the foundations of the road
were now higher, obscuring some of the view he
had envisaged. The road was causing further
disruption because apart from the ancestral hall
all the buildings to its inland side had to be
cleared to make way for new commercial and
industrial buildings. 
Ribbon development was conflicting with
neighbourhood place, focused on the tree, and
lineage place focused on the hall. A heated con-
frontation between the county work team man-
aging this disruption and villagers furious
about the inadequate compensation paid them
to rebuild or buy new homes elsewhere was 
defused by the manager of the ancestral hall.
He denounced corrupt county cadres who kept
the proceeds of the leasing of land to them-
selves, while urging on the villagers the new
job opportunities that industrial developments
such as the one he himself managed could offer
them. So the villagers withdrew and the road
and the two territorial places were maintained
in a state of tense peace.
In 1995 the riverbank had been even more
firmly reinforced with a lining of concrete
blocks, and a few yards further down a new
bridge connected the road to the county city on
the other bank. But the earth god shrine had
also been rebuilt. A ramp of stone stairs 
descended from the end of the bridge down to
the small promontory on which the shrine lay.
Beyond the shrine, the water’s edge was a place
where women from the neighbourhood washed
clothes in the shallows. In short, Cui-a-be was
being maintained as a territorial place, while 
a state-capitalist territorialisation ran a scar
through it.
On my return in 2002, new trees had been
planted on the riverbank beside the road. But
factories flanked the ancestral hall. Where in
1995 on one side there had been two half-
destroyed village houses there was now a four-
storey plastics factory. Its exterior was surfaced
with glazed white tiles and green reflecting
glass, but it also featured a curved front ve-
randa and low rear wings roofed with red tiles
and stumpy winged eaves in the Chinese style.
The manager of the ancestral hall now worked
as catering manager in this factory. But he also
spent time in a new old people’s recreation hall,
an addition to the ancestral hall whose con-
struction he had overseen. 
From the point of view of someone driving
along this quite pleasant extension of the county
city, the ancestral hall appears suddenly in the
opening between two factories, lower than they
are. The black tiles and the upturns at the ends of
the ridges of its roofs could be seen as a symbol
of Chinese historicity, but it is not a tourist des-
tination. It functions as all its predecessors did,
as the focal building of a local co-residential 
lineage. But now that function appears as an in-
terval in an entirely different territorialisation,
that of capitalist industrialisation stretching in a
ribbon out of the capital city of the county that
promotes it and provides some of its infrastruc-
ture. Each has compromised with the other,
after quite acrimonious negotiations and some
stylistic nods by the Malaysian Chinese in-
vestor in the plastics factory toward his Chinese
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identification with his county of origin. There is
an element of self-consciousness in this juxta-
position but it has been neither commodified
nor sponsored by the county as ‘heritage.’ Its
foundation and significance is too low-level and
small to merit the attention of county historians
or archaeologists.
The head of the village committee, elected
for the third time, told us that since the ances-
tral hall was rebuilt the people in the village
had become more united (tong+e) and he
added that they now understand better how
they can benefit from the building of factories.
On the same occasion, the ex-cadre manager,
an older man, introduced a much longer view
of history. He told us that he had once visited a
Buddhist monk in the neighbouring region of
Zhangzhou who told him that history was a 
series of alternations of destruction and con-
struction. Now Mao’s destruction had given
way to the current period (since 1978) of con-
struction. By ‘construction’ he also meant re-
construction. “But, he added, young people are
forgetful, so I am not sure…” The element of
doubt as to whether the assertion of territorial
place that he had led would be maintained is
both poignant and realistic.
Temple and Green Fields
Nearly ten years before taking on the recon-
struction of the ancestral hall, he had been the
manager of the rebuilding of the more inclusive
focus of the village as a territorial place, its
local temple. When I visited Meifa in 1992 I
asked three other villagers of his age why the
temple and not the hall had been rebuilt. They
said that the temple is where festivals are held
for the whole village as a living entity, whereas
the ancestral hall is just for commemoration of
ancestors. The temple festivals are the greatest
occasions of gathering, entertainment and
feasting in the village year. Bringing food from
every house in the village to tables where it is
presented in the large space in front of the tem-
ple, emptying that same space in the evenings
to watch theatre performances on the stage to
the side of the temple, the comings and goings
from house to temple retrace the territorial
place of co-residence and its main focus. 
In front of the temple and its open space the
view continues onto paddy fields flanked on
the other three sides in the middle distance 
by village houses. No single-storey courtyard
houses remain. They are all two or more
storeys high, with flat roofs and walls lined by
white tiles. But within this changed frame, the
fields have a special significance. In one of the
legends of the founding of the temple it had
once faced in the opposite direction, toward the
river. According to this legend, customary reg-
ulation stated that the land in front was com-
munal, for the upkeep of the village temple and
its festivals. But the piece of land in front was
little and infertile. In the other direction, the
land behind was fertile and extensive but 
belonged to one rich man. The inequality be-
tween private and communal land caused un-
rest among the villagers. They consulted the
temple god through a spirit medium. The god’s
advice was to reverse the temple’s orientation
so that its front entrance faced onto the rich
man’s fields. By this ruse, they would become
communal by virtue of the customary regula-
tion. Overnight, so the story goes, the effica-
cious god himself produced the miracle of this
reversal. 
The Urbanisation of Meifa Village
. . . .
261
As I have said, these fertile village fields
were confiscated and redistributed in the first
decollectivisation. They were then collectivised
into the land of one or more of the production
teams of the brigade and redistributed once
again in the 1980s to villagers. Beyond them is
another open space that is ready for industrial
development. But it has not been filled. There 
is no industrial threat to the fields, which are still
cultivated by village women (men are in paid
employment). The spacious view from the tem-
ple’s entrance is open to a gap in the hills be-
yond, and when the paddy is flooded waters
gather in the foreground, a manifestation of the
accumulation of qi energies. The distributed
green fields are still important to the temple and
the fengshui of the whole village.
In 1995 the temple stood alone in open
fields with trees behind it, the river hidden be-
hind them, and the hills beyond the river visible
above the trees. They still provide a good rear
protection. But in 2002 a pair of smooth pink,
plastered buildings had been built inside a
walled enclosure a few metres to one side of the
temple. These pink cubes were a little higher
than the black tiles and winged ridges of the
temple’s roofs. When we asked about them, we
learned that the land on which they were built
had been bought and set aside as industrial
land. A man of the same surname as the village
residents but from another place had bought the
lease, built these cubes as a factory, and had
then wanted to add a large hall for his own an-
cestors. The county would not, apparently, have
opposed this affront, but Meifa villagers resis-
ted in strength. We have not yet had time to as-
certain details of the confrontation, but the hall
had not been built and the factory buildings had
been left empty, new but abandoned for the
time being. The ancestral hall of their owner
would have become a gathering place for the
diaspora of one large family from another
place, encroaching upon the territorial place of
a village that happened to be a local lineage of
the same name.
I asked the ex-cadre who had managed the
rebuilding of the temple and the ancestral hall
whether he thinks the fields in front of the tem-
ple could be turned into an industrial park.
“Not while people feel as they do now, it would
not be possible.” Again, he expressed a firm re-
solve but with a hint of times changing. Thus
far, then, on the outskirts of a small city in the
mountains of southern Fujian province, the
drama of encroachment on a territorial place
by city developers and capitalist entrepreneurs
has been played out with mixed success on all
sides. It is a drama of negotiated conflict and
compromise, in which territorial place is de-
fined and retained against other territoriali-
sations. Those other territorialisations create
nodes that do not make territorial places but in-
stead create territory of a more abstract kind
with centres that are on a larger scale – city 
region, or commercial region of marketing and
other operations, such as the diaspora of an 
entrepreneur’s family and the nodes in the op-
erations that export the goods his factory might
eventually produce. 
*
*    *
What do these small-scale dramas say about
the large processes by which I introduced them,
state and capitalist territorialisations? First let
me point out that the relatively small industries
that are being built on the outskirts of Anxi’s
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county seat in Meifa produce for export from
China. They are a small part of globalised capi-
talism. Next let me underline that villagers are
themselves involved as employees of these en-
terprises, at levels from management down to
worker. And let me add that in 1995 there were
three Meifa businessmen running their own
manufacturing operations elsewhere and sel-
dom at home in their village houses. In other
words, the village included agents of the county
and of industrial estate developments. 
The concatenation of these different agen-
cies was not only territorial. It could easily
occur in the same person. The same person
could be a protagonist in county and industrial
development and in the retention and redefini-
tions of the village as a territorial place focused
on a temple, a local lineage focused on an an-
cestral hall, and, within both, the neighbour-
hood focused on the riverbank fengshui tree and
the small Earth God temple. For instance, the
ex-cadre is a department manager of a plastics
factory, and in that position he is functioning as
an earner of income for a family of whom he is
both patriarch and family manager. Through
connections to officials in the county govern-
ment he has in the near past negotiated the ex-
tension of county transport and its infrastructure
through parts of Meifa village. And of course he
has all this time maintained his ideal persona of
local loyalist, most recently by being involved
in the addition of an old people’s centre to the
ancestral hall. The young villagers, about whose
memory he wonders, work for income that they
use instrumentally as consumers of what they
consider to be the most modern products. In that
respect they are liberal, self-seeking individual-
ists living in an ahistorical search for a secure
livelihood and material enjoyment. Their sense
of family in this respect is confined to a conju-
gal family. It may well be that as elsewhere in
rural China their relation with their elders is
negotiable rather than assumed and guaranteed.
At the same time they take enthusiastic part in
the temple’s festivals, as members of their
households and beneficiaries of the fortunes of
the place in which they live. 
Of course there is more to come in Meifa.
Over the next twenty years the gradual incor-
poration of the village into the county city
may turn the territory of the local temple into
an urban neighbourhood. That would make its
temple an equivalent of the neighbourhood
temples of the older parts of the city across the
river, which have been revived and continue 
to thrive. The ancestral hall will probably 
remain but may become more like a centre for
lineage members, many of whom will have
been dispersed into other parts of the province
and the world: a diasporic centre like the one
that the interloping businessman tried to build
next to the temple. By then both hall and tem-
ple may have been brought to the attention of
county historians and visitors. Perhaps they
will introduce themselves as places with illus-
trated pamphlets and websites telling the story
of the green fields, the ancient riverbank tree
and other stories that hint at a far longer his-
tory of Chinese fengshui cosmology. But so
far they have not been turned into heritage
sites. The way in which the city, capitalist and
place codes refer to each other has remained a 
mutually resistant compromise, not a mutual
incorporation. 
At this reduced scale, the processes that
have been described in the most general terms
The Urbanisation of Meifa Village
. . . .
263
by theorists and social scientists translate the
concatenation of different subjectivities, with
the quite different senses of time and history
that accompany the different territorialisations
that code and decode each other at this level.
Nothing is quited as abstract, general or des-
tructive and enveloping as the theorists make
out. First, there are the specifiable abstract ter-
ritorialisations of the state and of capitalism –
with their peculiar mixes of styles and of traces
of different cosmologies and subjectivities.
Then there are the nodes of these large-scale,
decentralised territorialisations, the factories
and apartment blocks, which can be appropri-
ated as new kinds of territorial places. Finally,
my main emphasis is on the remaking of terri-
torial places that tell a local history. There are
other territorialities that tell a history on a far
greater scale, in particular those of a sovereign
state. But they do not define places in the phys-
ical, multi-sensorial sense I have emphasized.
Their centres are referential and virtual, desti-
nations for travel and communication. Territo-
rial place can only work below a certain scale.
But its remaking is done in reference to the
larger, abstract scales of territorialisation and it
re-orients state and capitalist projects through
the room for manoeuvre that it and countless
others make, stretch and link laterally through
the greater scales of reference.
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Abstract
Stephan Feuchtwang, Tales of Territoriality. The Urban-
isation of Meifa Village, China
Territorial place is the most open and inclusive of places.
At the same scale the terrifying abstractions of deterrito-
rialisation can be seen to be a negotiated stand-off be-
tween different territorialisations. In other words, the
deterritorialisation thesis of Deleuze and Guattari, the
state project thesis of James Scott, and the dislocation
thesis of postmodernists need severe modification. That
modification is carried out by ethnography and local his-
tory, here by a case study of a Chinese village that is in the
process of being urbanised. What is revealed when this is
done is that so-called deterritorialisation is a pair of terri-
torialisations, of state projects and of capitalist ribbon 
development and the nodes of its economic institutions
and functions. At this scale they are brought into nego-
tiation with reappropriations of territorial place by local
actors. 
Résumé
Stephan Feuchtwang, Récits de territorialité. L’urbanisa-
tion du village Meifa, Chine
Le territoire est le plus ouvert et le plus inclusif de tous les
lieux. À cette échelle les redoutables abstractions que re-
présente la déterritorialisation peuvent être vues comme un
compromis entre différentes formes de territorialisation. En
d’autres termes, les thèses de Deleuze et Guattari, de James
Scott et des postmodernes, qui mettent l’accent sur la dis-
location, doivent être révisées. Cette tâche incombe à l’eth-
nographie et à l’histoire locale. Dans cet article, une étude
de cas sur un village chinois en voie d’urbanisation fait res-
sortir que la soi-disant déterritorialisation est en fait le 
résultat de deux territorialisations : celle qui relève du pro-
gramme de l’État et celle qui s’appuie sur une frange capi-
taliste de développement dont les points nodaux constituent
les institutions économiques et leurs fonctions. À ce ni-
veau, la négociation s’impose avec la réappropriation par
les acteurs locaux du territoire. 
